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Abstract—Cloud computing security issues are being reported in
newspapers, television, and on the Internet, on a daily basis.
Furthermore, in 2013, Edward Snowden alleged backdoors were
placed in a number of encryption systems by the National
Security Agency causing confidence in public encryption to drop
even further. Our solution allows the end-user to add a layer
of unbreakable security by encrypting the data locally with
a random number generator prior to uploading data to the
Cloud. The prototype one-time pad generator is impervious to
cryptanalysis because it generates unbreakable random binary
sequences from chaos sources initiated from a natural noise.
Specialised one-to-Cloud applications for this device means key
distribution problems do not exist, even when used at different
locations. A JavaScript application maximised the encryptor
key entropy using a von Neumann algorithm and modulo-
two arithmetic, where the key passed the National Institute of
Standards and Technology statistical suite of tests. It is hoped
that the final size of the generator should be similar to a typical
Universal Serial Bus device.
Keywords–Cloud security, Snowden, backdoors, one-time pad,
chaos, noise, entropy, von Neumann.
I. INTRODUCTION
To address the problems of poor security on the Cloud, a
prototype random number generator was created to encode data
locally before being stored on the Cloud. Traffic on the Cloud
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is forecast to increase by
twenty percent by 2019 [1], but security issues are affecting
public confidence in this service. Breaches in security are
rarely discovered instantly [2] and up to six months may elapse
before being reported. The elapsed time between discovering
security breaches has been reduced [3], but to satisfy the
European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulations
(GDPR) coming into law in May 2018, mandatory breach
notification must be reported by companies within 72 hours.
Heavy fines of up to 4 percent of the annual turnover of a
company will be imposed if they fail to report within this
time [4].
Hacking on servers is reported almost daily in newspapers,
TV and online [5], a problem compounded by the alleged pres-
ence of backdoors in public encryption. Microsoft employees,
Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson gave a presentation in 2007
and hinted at the possibility of a backdoor in a random number
generator: On the Possibility of a backdoor in the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP800-90 Dual
Elliptic Curve Pseudo Random Number Generators [6] [7].
Interestingly, in April 2014, NIST dropped the Dual EC PRNG
from their standards [8]
The New York Times in 2013 linked this presentation to
documents leaked by Edward Snowden [9], where he alleged
backdoors were placed by the National Security Agency (NSA)
in certain public encryption systems [10]. Hence, nobody
knows for sure what weaknesses exist in public encryption but
probably the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm
is secure and has no backdoors. That said, an encryption
system whereby the client can encode his data locally before
being stored in the Cloud, is a solution to certain Cloud
security problems. Our prototype provides a layer of security
using the unbreakable One-Time Pad (OTP) random binary
number stream generated from two chaos generators. This
is not a novel idea but how the sources are connected and
initialised using a cosmic noise source, is.
A. One-time pad history
Figure 1 shows the SIGSALY encryption system developed
by A. B. Clarke and Alan Turing in Bell Labs during WWII
[11]. SIGSALY weighed 55-tonnes and had a key distribution
problem requiring a key the same length as the plaintext. Nev-
ertheless, it produced unbreakable OTP encryption ciphers for
encrypting transatlantic conversations between Churchill and
Roosevelt. Similar OTP systems were used between Russian
and American governments in the 60’s, for securing the famous
“hotline”. Our prototype random number generator should be
no bigger than a typical Universal Serial Bus (USB) device
and with no key distribution problems because it stays with
the client who may use it at different locations.
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Section I explains why local encryption is necessary and
explains how the OTP was successfully used during WWII
and again in the sixties, to give unbreakable security protecting
conversations between heads of state.
Figure 1. The 55-ton SIGSALY encoding system.
Section II outlines the structure of the OTP encoder and dis-
cusses the nature of a random generator initialised using cos-
mic natural noise and how it may be classified as a true random
binary number generator. A medical application example for
protecting patient confidentiality is given in Section III. Section
IV explains the prototype design and discusses how OTPs were
generated from chaotic analogue oscillators. In Section V, we
discuss the JavaScript application for maximising OTP entropy
and show how it interfaces with the data. NIST randomness p-
test results for simulation and prototype circuits are discussed
in Section VI, and the conclusion stated in Section VII.
II. THE OTP PROTOTYPE
Figure 2 outlines the system for generating OTP random bit
streams for encoding data locally prior to uploading to the
Cloud.
Figure 2. Prototype OTP generation.
Chaotic oscillators generated on a computer produce random
binary sequences that have finite sequence lengths and hence
are not truly random. This is due to the finite state of com-
puter arithmetic [12] [13] and produce cryptographically poor
ciphers. Random sequences generated from chaotic maps im-
plemented on computers, similarly, have repeatable sequence
lengths and also produce weak keys [14] [15] [16]. However,
random binary sequences from analogue chaos circuits ini-
tiated from natural noise, have an infinite number of states
and so produce random binary streams which have, in theory,
infinite sequence lengths and generate excellent ciphers. The
prototype can produce unlimited amounts of unbreakable OTP
ciphers from deterministic chaos sources initialised with noise
from a Frequency Modulation (FM) receiver and qualifies
the prototype as a truly random source, rather than a pseudo
random source [17] [18] [19]. Initial Conditions (IC) for each
generator are applied to each chaos source, but for simulation
only, the IC noise was provided from a random noise generator
in PSpice called RND. In [20], we explained how the OTP was
exported from the simulator circuit and stored to a text file
using PSpice VECTOR1 parts and processed in the JavaScript
application. However, a different technique must be used for
the prototype and is considered in the following section.
A. Storing the OTP in an Arduino Shield
The OTP stream from the prototype was stored in an Arduino
memory shield attached to the main Arduino board. An ex-
clusive OR gate connected across two monostables created
a clock stream from the two gate inputs and was used for
writing ’ones’ to the shield. Effectively, the gate removed the
random temporal element from the bit stream (but not the
randomness). The complete prototype is undergoing tests at
present, but initial tests show it is producing cryptographically-
strong encryptors. Only one chaotic oscillator was examined
in this paper; the other chaos source is a novel implementation
of the Chua oscillator [21].
III. A MEDICAL APPLICATION FOR THE PROTOTYPE
There are many potential applications for the prototype gen-
erator and here a medical application explains how patient
information displayed on medical images, is protected. The
following scenario is a patient who has persistent headaches
and high blood pressure and is recommended by the doctor to
have a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scan at the nearest
hospital. Such scans are produced using the international stan-
dard for storing, distributing and processing medical images
and is referred to as the Digital Imaging and Communications
in Medicine (DICOM) format [23]. However, these images
show patient private information around the peripheral of the
image [22] and must be protected from unwanted interception,
otherwise patient confidentiality is compromised.
Figure 3. Encoding medical images.
At present, the procedure for sending MRI scans to the doctor’s
office is not secure. After scanning the patient, the hospital
sends the MRI images containing patient personal information
by post. Alternatively, they give them directly to the patient to
bring to the doctor. Both methods have security weaknesses
as the images could be lost in transit. Our solution involves
hospital staff encoding the scanned images using the OTP
generator and uploading the encoded images to the Cloud
directory assigned to that doctor. The hospital staff then saves
the encoding OTP to a memory device and gives it to the
patient who then gives it to the doctor to decode the scans
at his office. A similar legal application concerns the legal
profession operating between office and court. Here, data is
encoded locally before uploading to the Cloud and the OTP
replaces all those bulky folders carried previously. There are
many such applications where people operating between two
locations could use the encoder system to prevent sensitive
information being lost in transit.
IV. THE LORENZ CHAOTIC ANALOGUE OSCILLATOR
Claude Shannon’s 1949 paper [24] outlined presciently how
digital chaotic maps could encrypt data using symmetric
key encryption. Since then chaos cryptography has grown
considerably, and from 2000, many chaotic maps were
used in multi-algorithmic systems for encrypting data on a
randomised block-by-block basis [25]. Our prototype uses
Lorenz and Chua chaotic analogue chaos oscillators to create
cryptographically-strong encryptors because of their ergodic
properties. Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist, modelled weather
patterns in the sixties and discovered chaos theory and Sensi-
tivity to Initial Conditions (SIC), one of the hallmarks of chaos
systems, when he truncated places of decimal from five down
to three in his model after one run and it produced different
results. The following first-order coupled equations appeared
in his 1963 [26] paper (largely ignored at the time):
x = −P ∫ t
t0
{x− y}dt
y = − ∫ t
t0
{−Rx + y + 10xz}dt
z = − ∫ t
t0
{Bz − 10xy}dt
(1)
The equations in integral form allow for electronic integrator
implementation and also include a scaling factor of ten to re-
duce signal amplitudes for electronic devices. The parameters
Lorenz used were: B = 2.666, P = 10, R = 28, but these were
changed to: B = 2.8, P = 11, and R = 27.5 to maximise the
cryptographic strength or entropy, of the OTP.
A. Thresholding the chaos signal
A random binary OTP stream was produced by thresholding
the x signal at two voltages corresponding to the values at
the centres of the (x-y) attractor shown in Figure 4 (b). These
centres are the Fixed Points (FP) of (1), where one centre
could represent a ‘1’ when in that region, and when the other
centre is visited, a ‘0’ is created. The FPs are determined by
assuming the system is approximately linear at the origin, i.e.,
(x = y = z = 0), so the coordinates at each lobe centre are
calculated as follows:
dx
dt
= 10(y − x) = 0⇒ x = y (2)
Hence, we may write:
dy
dt
= Rx− x− xz = 28x− x− xz = 0 (3)
Substituting z = 27, yields:
dz
dt
= x2 −Bz = 0⇒= ±
√
B(R− 1) (4)
The FPs are the coordinates of the lobe centres C1,2, given by:
C1,2 = {+
√
B(R− 1),−
√
B(R− 1), (R− 1)} (5)
Substituting the Lorenz parameter values gives the locii of the
attractor as:
C1,2 = {+8.48V,−8.48V, 27V } (6)
Magnitude scaling by 10 yields FPs equal to ± 0.8485 V at
2.7 V. Adding a bias shifting voltage to the bipolar x-signal
makes it polar in form and gives threshold levels of 3.15
V and 4.84 V. The upper and lower threshold voltages are
superimposed on the biased x-signal as shown in Figure 4
(a), and the out-of-phase set and reset sequences from each
comparator were converted to constant widths by two 74121
monostables and superimposed on the Lorenz strange attractor
as shown in Figure 4 (b).
Figure 4. (a) FP thresholds (b) Butterfly attractor.
The threshold components were calculated by assuming a total
potentiometer of 1 MΩ and Vref = 1.24 V:
V high = 4.84 V = V ref
R10 + R11 + R12
R12
(7)
Similarly for R11,
V low = 3.15 V = V ref
R10 + R11 + R12
R11 + R12
(8)
Figure 5 is the Lorenz chaotic oscillator circuit to realise (1).
The circuit was simulated using the latest v 17.2 Cadence R©
OrCAD PSpice V17.2 using Analogue Behavioural Model
(ABM) parts to achieve multiplication and integration but
subsequently were replaced with actual model parts [27] [28].
The four-quadrant AD633 device modelled the cross-product
nonlinear terms, xy and xz, terms necessary for chaos pro-
duction and the TL084 quad operational amplifier integrated
circuit solved the equation using a summing inverting integra-
tor configuration.
The set and reset pulses from the monostables were con-
nected to a 7486 exclusive OR gate (XOR) which outputs a
clock stream for controlling when the OTP ones and zeroes are
written to the Arduino shield attached to the main Arduino.
The ’ones’ are written to the shield from the monostable reset
output, and the clock signal determines when the ’zeroes’ are
written. This is a different procedure to that used for storing
the OTP during simulation [20], where the OTP was written
to a text file using vector parts and processed in a JavaScript
application.
Chaos oscillator initial conditions were obtained from a
detuned 433 MHz FM receiver integrated circuit.
Figure 5. Generating the OTP.
The output level of the natural noise is random and ensures
the chaos sources produce a random output that cannot be
reproduced by an unwanted third party. The oscillator and
threshold components are: R1 = R2 = 100 kΩ, R3 = 36.3 kΩ,
R4 = 10 kΩ, R5 = 1 MΩ, R6 = 10 kΩ, R7 = 357 kΩ, and C =
50 pF. The potential divider components are: R8 and R9, bias
the x signal by 4 V, R10 = 607 kΩ, R11 = 138 kΩ and R12 =
256 kΩ.
V. JAVASCRIPT INTERFACE APPLICATION
The original MRI scan in Figure 6 shows where the patient
information was located but removed for obvious reasons.
The JavaScript application performs modulo two arithmetic
between the OTP from the Arduino shield and the pixel array
data from the bitmap medical image. In this example, the
encoded image displays horizontal lines (see Figure 6), which
would makes the encoded image susceptible to cryptanalysis
because it now contains a bias and should be avoided at all
costs. However, the bias was deliberately introduced by making
the OTP purposely short because the application code repeated
some of the random streams to make the OTP the same length
as the image. In the middle pane, we observe no bias lines,
even with no von Neumann correction applied. The OTP from
the actual prototype should always be the same length as the
plaintext, otherwise, the encryptor is weak.
The interface also applies the von Neumann (vN) algorithm
to deskew, or unbias, the generated OTP bit stream. Whenever
a ‘00’ and ‘11’ dibit pair occurs in the stream, they are rejected.
Dibit ‘01’ is converted to 0 and ‘10’ to 1 [29]. However, the
algorithm is inefficient because 75 percent of the data is lost.
Another important requirement, often not applied when using
this algorithm, is that the dibit streams should be from two
uncorrelated chaos data streams. In the prototype, this alternate
bit independence is achieved by using two independent chaotic
data streams.
VI. TESTING THE ONE-TIME-PAD
To resist cryptanalysis and to ensure an encryptor is truly
random for correct certification, we considered the following
tests:
• The autocorrelation test should display a single Kro-
necker delta auto-correlation function,
• The Power Spectral Density (PSD) should be uniform,
• The OTP must have maximum entropy by operating
the chaos sources in a chaotic region to produce
positive Lyapunov Exponents (LE) [30] [31].
Shannon entropy measures randomness but essentially is the
Kolmogorov Complexity (KC), created simultaneously by
Andrey Kolmogorov and Ray Solmonoff and specifies the
minimum length to which a string of binary digits may
be compressed (a truly random sequence is incompressible)
[32]. According to Brudno’s theorem and for certain phase
space conditions, the Kolmogorov-Sinai Entropy (KSE) is the
Algorithmic Complexity (AC) for all trajectories [33].
However, the cryptographic strength of random number
sequences was also tested using the NIST suite of tests (revised
in 2010). There are other test suites such as the ENT, TestU01,
CryptX, Diehard, but the NIST suite of tests is universally
accepted as the most comprehensive [34]. The NIST suite
contains non-parameter tests for short OTP sequences and
parameter tests for several million bit sequences. Table I shows
the NIST results from simulation and prototype circuits, and
from true noise sequences downloaded from [35].
VII. CONCLUSION
Poor Cloud security was addressed and we proposed a solution
for a system which created an extra layer of security using a
OTP random number generator. The generator used analogue
chaos sources initialised by a natural noise source to generate
unlimited amounts of unbreakable OTPs that passed the NIST
statistical tests. Personalising encryption locally by the client,
prior to uploading data to the Cloud, gave complete control
provided a new encryptor is used each time. This makes it
expensive in encryptor keys but memory is cheap and plentiful.
During testing, the JavaScript application [36] was used to
investigate how parameter changes affected the OTP entropy.
The application also applied a von Neumann algorithm to
maximise the entropy of the OTP. The GDPR legislation in
2018, will see hefty fines being imposed on companies who
fail to meet the 72-hour deadline and it could be argued that
our prototype means data was never available to a third party.
Refinements to this system are being investigated such as
extracting the patient personal information in the DICOM’s
metadata and encoding it separately from the medical image.
Figure 6. One-time pad JavaScript application.
TABLE I. NIST RESULTS for NOISE, SIMULATION and PROTOTYPE.
Statistical Test P-value natural noise P-value simulation OTP P-value prototype OTP Passed/Fail
Frequency test P = 0.4122 P = 0.503 P = 0.403 Pass
Block frequency P = 0.116 P = 0.216 P = 0.303 Pass
Runs P = 0.7846 P = 0.508 P = 0.683 Pass
Block Longest Run Ones P = 0.5388 P = 0.490 P = 0.553 Pass
Binary Matrix Rank P = 0.7138 P = 0.333 P = 0.430 Pass
D Fourier Transform P = 0.5206 P = 0.216 P = 0.420 Pass
Non-overlap Tp Match P = NA P = Na P = NA NA
Overlapping Tp Match P = 0.7729 P = 0.002 P = 0.090 Pass
Universal P = NA P = NA P = NA NA
Linear Complexity P = 0.9525 P = 0.263 P = 0.590 Pass
Serial (P1 = 0.1971, P2 = 0.544) P1 = 0.197, P2 = 0.544 P1 = 0.490, P2 = 0.509 Pass
Approximate Entropy P = 0.1143 P = 0.201 P = 0.290 Pass
Cumulative Sums P = 0.4444 P = 0.563 P = 0.490 Pass
Random Excursions P = NA P = 0.216 P = 0.230 Pass
Random Excursion Variant P = NA P = 0.216 P = 0.240 Pass
This would result in a much smaller OTP which could then be
recombined with the image before uploading to the Cloud.
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